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I
t is hard to miss the important role the housing sector plays in the macroeconomy.
In 2004 the value of real estate held in household portfolios amounted to over
$17 trillion, or 143 percent of annual nominal gross domestic product (Board of
Governors 2005). This amount is larger than all corporate equity held directly, through
mutual funds and pension funds combined. Closely linked to housing is the mortgage
market, which now totals over $7.5 trillion. On the average household’s balance sheet,
a home mortgage is the largest item on the liability side, easily dwarfing consumer
credit, which includes credit card debt and car loans, by a factor of almost four to one.
Macroeconomists, therefore, have spent considerable effort on incorporating
housing and housing finance into macroeconomic models. In understanding the
effects that housing and the various related government policies have on households
in particular and the economy in general, recognizing the economic and demographic
diversity among households is crucial. Net worth, housing value (gross and net of
mortgages), and income vary substantially among households not only by age but
within age groups. Macroeconomists thus employ models—called heterogeneous
agent models—that can accommodate this diversity. 
This article is a progress report on where this line of research currently stands.
At the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference “Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the
Macroeconomy” in May 2005, several papers shared a common framework: namely,
using macro models with heterogeneous agents.
1 This article discusses four of the
conference papers, the issues the researchers explored, the progress they made, and
the challenges that lie ahead. 
The paper by Fang Yang (2005) deals with the life-cycle behavior of housing ver-
sus nonhousing consumption. Her objective is to build a model to account for two
peculiar features of consumption over the life cycle.
The paper by Wenli Li and Rui Yao (2005) studies the effect of house price





The author is a research economist and assistant policy adviser in the macropolicy group
of the Atlanta Fed’s research department. He thanks William Roberds and Ellis Tallman for
helpful comments.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 40 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
not have a huge effect on the economy as
a whole, different households—in particu-
lar those of different age and asset hold-
ings—will be affected very differently by
house price changes. An economic model
with heterogeneous agents is therefore
necessary to measure the effects a price
increase might have on agents with differ-
ent incomes and asset holdings.
The paper by Matthew Chambers,
Carlos Garriga, and Donald Schlagenhauf
(2005b) asks how different households
are affected by the availability of different
mortgage contracts: most importantly,
which mortgage contract is most success-
ful in allowing younger households (that
tend to have less savings and thus might have trouble coming up with the necessary
down payment) to purchase a house.
The paper by Karsten Jeske and Dirk Krueger (2005) addresses the important
policy question of whether it is desirable to subsidize mortgage interest rates. One
important subsidy is the implicit federal guarantee for government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs). Jeske and Krueger examine the distributional effect of such a subsidy.
They find that mostly high-income and high-net-worth households benefit while, both
in terms of welfare and homeownership, low-income and low-net-worth households
will not benefit at all.
Microlevel Data on Housing and Mortgage Finance
Trying to answer the questions mentioned above requires models that are detailed
enough to accommodate a housing market and, most importantly, heterogeneity
among households. This heterogeneity is the crucial ingredient of any model
attempting to determine the distributional effects of housing policy. Before examin-
ing the models, I first introduce some empirical facts coming out of microlevel data
to demonstrate how the aggregate numbers on income, real estate, and mortgage
debt are distributed across the population. Aggregate real estate values are approxi-
mately 143 percent of aggregate annual income. But income, real estate wealth,
mortgage debt, and net worth are very unevenly distributed both across and within
age groups. The data set used in this article’s computations is the Survey of
Consumer Finances (from the Federal Reserve Board) for the year 2001, which,
among other things, collects data on consumer income and balance sheets.
Table 1 shows homeownership rates by age group compared to the unconditional
homeownership rate (that is, over all age groups) of 67 percent. The homeownership
rate is the lowest, at about 30 percent, for households headed by persons below the
age of twenty-nine. The rate increases steeply over the next two age cohorts, peak-
ing at more than 80 percent for the sixty to sixty-nine age group and moderating
slightly after that. Not all homeowners are equal, as Table 2 shows. Not only do fewer
young households own a home, but their homes tend to be smaller than those of older
households. The average homeowner increases real estate holdings from about
$100,000 until reaching his or her fifties, when he or she holds about $216,000 in real
estate, and then gradually downsizes the value of the primary residence. Mortgage
debt also displays a hump-shaped profile, though the peak occurs in the thirty to thirty-
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Table 1 
Homeownership Rates by Age Group
Homeownership







Note: The unconditional mean across all ages is 67.7 percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey
of Consumer Finances 2001nine age group. This pattern seems to be
consistent with the following scenario:
Households upgrade the size and obvi-
ously the value of the house they are living
in. Early in life most of the upgrading is
financed with larger mortgages. Home-
owners aged forty and older then tend to
finance upgrades out of savings rather
than larger mortgages.
In homeownership rates, even within
age groups there is substantial variation.
The first panel of Figure 1 plots rates by
income quintiles within each age group.
The chart shows that homeownership is
associated with high income, with house-
holds in the bottom quintile having
below-average ownership rates across all
age groups. The second panel of Figure 1
yields the same qualitative pattern for net worth, but the differences between
households with low and high net worth households are even more severe.
Households in the bottom quintile have only a 30 percent homeownership rate even
in the sixty to sixty-nine age group. In contrast, for all ages after forty, the second
through fifth quintiles display homeownership rates above the national average of
67 percent.
2
Vast differences also exist between homeowners and renters. The first panel of
Figure 2 plots median income by age group for the whole population and for home-
owners versus renters. For the population as a whole, household income increases
from just below $30,000 for the youngest age cohort to almost $60,000 for fifty to
fifty-nine age group, after which it declines to about $25,000 for the seventy and over
age group. Homeowners tend to have much larger median incomes than renters; the
median homeowner makes roughly twice as much as the median renter. Moreover,
the hump in the income process is more pronounced for homeowners. The same gen-
eral pattern holds for average incomes (see the second panel of Figure 2).
The contrasts between homeowners and renters are even more obvious in terms
of net worth positions. The third and fourth panels of Figure 2 plot median and average
net worth, respectively, by age group. Households accumulate savings during their
working years, moreso than does the population as a whole. The median homeowner
accumulates more than $200,000 during his or her lifetime. Because the net worth
distribution is so skewed, average net worth is considerably larger: The average
homeowner accumulates more than $800,000 over a lifetime. The median renter,
however, has negligible net worth—consistently under $10,000—for all age groups.
In fact, 50 percent of all renters have essentially zero net worth. Even average net
worth for renters is below $100,000 in all age groups.
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1. The four papers introduced here as well as the program and the remaining papers are available on
the Atlanta Fed’s Web site at www.frbatlanta.org under “News & Events,” “Conferences,” “2005.”
2. The cutoff for the lowest income quintile is $15,400 in the youngest age group, increases to $26,700
for the fifty to fifty-nine age group, and then declines to $11,300 for households aged seventy and
above. The cutoff for net worth is zero for the youngest households and increases to $39,100 for
households aged seventy and above.
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Home Values and Mortgage Debt by
Homeowners’ Age Group
Value of Mortgage on
primary primary







Note: Values and debt shown in thousands of dollars.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey
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In summary, households differ substantially, both between and within age groups,
in their net worth positions and asset allocations. As one would expect, when house-
holds are young and middle-aged they accumulate savings for retirement, and one
form of savings is real estate. Even within age groups, there is considerable hetero-
geneity of households. Incomes and especially net worth vary substantially across age
groups and between renters and homeowners. When trying to answer questions such
as “What is the effect of increasing house prices?” or “Should we subsidize mortgage
interest rates?” one should take into account that different households will be affected
very differently by changes in house prices or government policies. An increase in
house prices might be beneficial to existing homeowners, but renters may not be
affected at all or, even worse, might suffer if rental rates increase. Likewise, subsidiz-
ing mortgage interest—for example, through mortgage interest tax-deductibility or
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Homeownership Patterns by Age, Income, and Net Worth
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer Finances 2001government guarantees on mortgage lenders—might mostly benefit existing home-
owners, who are well off already because they tend to have above-average income and
net worth. This consideration reinforces the importance of studying models with het-
erogeneous agents to account for the effects that policy has on agents with different
demographic and economic backgrounds.
A Generic Model with Housing
A key ingredient in the model is the life-cycle pattern, which implies two important
features the model must include. First, it must include the hump-shaped earnings
profile that the average household experiences, as shown in Figure 2. Second, the
model must generate a realistic life span, which means households of different age
groups face different mortality risk. Around the trend path of life-cycle earnings, a
household receives an uncertain stream of income over its life cycle and then tries to
maximize its lifetime discounted utility subject to a budget constraint. 
A household receives utility from consumption of both nonhousing goods c and
housing goods h. Income comes both from labor and investment income. The maxi-
mization problem of a household of age t in recursive form is then defined in the fol-
lowing way: The value of starting period t with assets a and labor productivity y is the
maximum value of current utility plus expected discounted period t + 1 value as a
function of future assets and future labor productivity.
Va y uc h E V ay
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Figure 2
Income and Net Worth by Age Group
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer Finances 200144 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
subject to a number of constraints:
c + h + b′ = wy + a;
a′ = (1 – δ
h)h + (1 + r)b′;
b′ ≥  –B – ;
c, h ≥  0.
In the objective function I use a discount factor β common to all age groups
as well as additional discounting in the form of ρt, which is the conditional survival
probability that depends on age. The first constraint is the budget constraint.
Labor income measured as wage rate w times labor productivity y plus assets a
can be spent on nonhousing consumption c, housing h, and other savings b′. The
second constraint specifies the next period’s assets a′ as the sum of housing stock
net of depreciation and maintenance cost (1 – δ
h)h and other savings times the
gross interest rate (1 + r)b′. The third condition is a borrowing constraint that
specifies a lower bound on asset holdings—in other words, an upper bound on
borrowing. Finally, the fourth condition states that both types of consumption have
to be nonnegative. This model closely resembles that of Aiyagari (1994), with some
distinguishing features: two types of consumption, a very particular borrowing con-
straint, and a life-cycle component.
3
Denote uc and uh the derivatives of the utility function with respect to nonhous-
ing consumption c and housing h, respectively. Assuming for now that the borrowing




The first condition is completely standard: The bond return, weighted by the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (also called the pricing kernel) and dis-
counted by ρtβ, equals one. The second condition has a similar structure but also
incorporates today’s marginal rate of substitution between housing and nonhousing
consumption. Both conditions guarantee optimality by ensuring that no utility-
improving substitution exists between either consumption and savings or consump-
tion and housing. Next, combine the two Euler equations into
This condition states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and housing equals the cost of one unit of housing computed as the depreciation rate
plus the opportunity cost of housing measured as the bond rate r. I also divide by
1 + r because the payoff from housing is in the current period while the bond pays



















































FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA housing, and if there were a rental market in this model, (r + δ
h)/(1 + r) would be
the rental rate per unit.
To put some structure into the model, assume that the utility function takes the
following form:
This is the form normally used in the literature. The parameter σ is the risk aver-
sion coefficient, η determines the substitutability between housing and nonhousing
consumption, and θ is a weighting parameter for how much the household values
nonhousing consumption. How good is this model in accounting for the observed
data? From the model, one can deduce two implications. First, the user cost formula
for housing can be written as
that is, housing over nonhousing consumption stays constant over the life cycle.
Next, from the first Euler condition (equation [1]) and the fact that the h/c ratio stays
constant over time one deduces that
Normally it will be the case that β(1 + r) < 1.
4 Since the survival probability ρt is less
than one, the right-hand side is greater than one. Since σ > 0, the second implication
of the model has now been shown: Without borrowing constraints, consumption
decreases over the life cycle, at least in expected terms. This result makes perfect
sense. According to the permanent income hypothesis, the mean path of earnings is
irrelevant in the absence of borrowing constraints; all that counts is the discounted
expected path of earnings. If the interest rate is lower than the rate of discounting,
households will choose a decreasing consumption path though there may be fluctu-
ations around this decrease because of changes in labor productivity.
Life-Cycle Patterns of Housing Consumption
The four conference papers mentioned in the introduction are all extensions of
















































45 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
3. Note that the timing convention here is slightly different from that in the Yang (2005) paper.
Specifically, I assume here that the housing choice h enters today’s utility instead of tomorrow’s. This
assumption makes the problem slightly easier to handle because agents pick housing goods for the
same period when their income uncertainty is revealed. Therefore, housing is a riskless asset, which
makes the optimality conditions slightly more tractable. Jeske and Krueger (2005), for instance, use
this timing convention. In their paper housing investment will nevertheless be risky because of uncer-
tain depreciation. In the Yang paper, on the other hand, households pick h for the following period
when the future productivity shock y′ is not known yet, a choice that makes housing a risky asset.
4. Economists usually pick the discount factor β so as to match the model’s capital-to-output ratio to
that in the data. One can show that for the realistic range of the remaining parameters of the model
the equilibrium interest rate r implied by this capital-to-output ratio satisfies β(1 + r) < 1.
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Figure 3
Consumption over the Life Cycle
Source: Yang (2005) (first panel); author’s calculations using data from Yang (2005) (second and third panels)a decreasing consumption profile and a constant housing versus nonhousing con-
sumption ratio, are at odds with the data. The first panel of Figure 3 shows average
household consumption on both housing and nonhousing goods by age group (of the
head of household). Notice that nonhousing consumption increases from about
$23,000 per year for households aged twenty to an average of $32,000 per year for
age forty-five and then decreases after that.
5
Contrast this observation to the behavior of housing consumption, which displays
an even sharper increase up to about age fifty-five but then does not drop as sharply
as nonhousing consumption. Not surprisingly, then, the h/c ratio is not constant but
rather increases over the life cycle, as shown in the second panel of Figure 3.
Can the increase in the h/cratio be accounted for without radical changes to the
model? One could imagine that younger agents face a higher depreciation rate of
housing or a higher interest rate.
6 Formally, assume that the consumption ratio at age
t now takes the following shape:
(3)
where ξt generates differences in households’ subjective user cost because of differ-
ences in depreciation and interest rates during the life cycle. Is it possible to quanti-
tatively match the observed ratio with realistic values of ξt? How positive would ξt
have to be for young agents and how negative for old agents in order to generate the
h/cfunction observed in the data? To compute this cost, I normalize the implicit cost
of a forty-five-year-old household to zero and back out the ξt from equation (3) using
the observed h/cratios. The third panel of Figure 3 shows this implicit cost ξt over the
life cycle. To account for the observed consumption patterns, older households would
have to find housing around 3 percentage points cheaper than those age forty-five do,
and, likewise, younger households would have to find housing 6 percentage points
more expensive. It is difficult to justify differences of this magnitude—almost 10 per-
centage points difference between age eighty-five and age thirty—entirely through
different borrowing costs or depreciation rates.
Yang’s paper can be thought of as finding other explanations to generate this
large difference in subjective user costs. Specifically, Yang introduces two crucial
ingredients into the model to account for the features observed in the data—binding
borrowing constraints and transaction costs—and shows that they can quantitatively
account for the increase in the consumption ratio.
7 One can easily add these two
features into the model above. First, assume that B
–
= –(1 – γ)h, that is, the household
can borrow only up to a maximum of a certain fraction of the house value. Parameter
γ can be viewed as the minimum down payment on a house. This constraint ensures
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5. Yang is not the first economist to point out this feature. Earlier work on the consumption profile
over the life cycle includes Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994); Attanasio and Browning (1995);
Attanasio and Weber (1995); and, more recently, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2002, 2004).
6. For example, one could justify this assumption with the fact that households with a younger head tend
to have a larger family size, and thus more persons per square foot cause a higher depreciation rate.
7. Yang introduces even more ingredients, such as a bequest motive and a social security system;
however, to illustrate the key intuition, a borrowing constraint and transaction costs are sufficient. 
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Figure 2) agents will be constrained in their borrowing early in life. In other words,
households cannot raise their consumption to the desired level derived from the per-
manent income model without violating their borrowing constraint. This restriction
binds because income is low early in life.
Second, adjusting the level of housing incurs transaction costs. Assume that if a
household had a housing level of hold last period and wants to change it to h today, it
has to pay a transaction cost of ψ(hold, h). Assume for now that the transaction cost
satisfies the following conditions:
ψ(hold, h) ≥  0;
ψ(hold, hold) = 0;
That is, the transaction cost function takes on nonnegative values, there is no cost
of leaving the size of the house unchanged,
8 and the transaction cost function is
convex.
9 In this economy the optimality condition between housing and nonhousing
consumption becomes
(4)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint and ψ1 and ψ2 are deriva-
tives of the transaction cost function with respect to the first and second argument,
respectively. This formula is the same one as before, linking the marginal rate of substi-
tution between housing and nonhousing consumption with the cost of purchasing hous-
ing. Instead of the user-cost formula of housing, one now has a weighted average
between the previous user cost (r + δ
h)/(1 + r) and the down payment ratio γ, where
the weight on γ is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint.
10
One can interpret the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (4) as the
subjective user cost of housing (net of transaction cost). The more the borrowing con-
straint binds, the higher the housing cost for the household. This result is intuitive: If
the constraint binds, the only way to afford more housing is to reduce current con-
sumption, which comes at a cost of γ units of consumption for every unit of housing
purchased. The remaining two terms come from the transaction cost function. They
determine the marginal cost of housing changes—that is, adjusting housing consumption
from hold to h in the current period and adjusting from h to h′ in the following period.
Using the same elasticity of substitution between the two consumption types as
in the Yang paper—that is, η = 0—one then obtains the following consumption ratio:
(5)
One way to interpret Yang’s paper is that the additional terms in the square brackets
tend to decrease in age; thus, inversely, the consumption ratio increases in age. For
young agents there are two channels: the borrowing constraint and the transaction
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA Since the subjective user cost for young agents (before transaction costs) is higher
than the cost (r + δ
h)/(1 + r) for unconstrained agents, the h/c ratio will increase just
as in the data because the subjective user cost decreases when the borrowing con-
straint is relaxed over the lifetime.
So far, the larger implicit housing cost causes young households to substitute
away from housing and into nonhousing goods, even without any transaction costs.
Transaction costs add to this effect. Since
the borrowing constraint induces a hump-
shaped profile for consumption (both
housing and nonhousing), young agents
have the tendency to increase their h.
Consequently, the following will be true
for any three consecutive housing con-
sumption values: hold ≤ h ≤ h′. In that case
ψ2(hold, h) ≥  0 ≥ ψ1(h, h′). Since the second term is discounted by ρtβE[uc(c′ , h′)/uc
(c, h)], one would expect the total effect to be positive. Both effects from borrowing
constraints and transactions costs explain why for young agents h/c can be lower
than the ratio derived in the frictionless version above.
For older agents the borrowing constraint will likely no longer bind. Instead, all
of the action comes from the transaction cost terms. The reverse of the argument for
young agents applies. Older agents want to reduce consumption because of dis-
counting due to lower survival probabilities. But picking h old ≥  h ≥  h′ implies ψ2(hold, h)
≤ 0 ≤ψ 1(h, h′). Again, the last term in equation (5) is subject to discounting, so the
ψ2(hold, h) ≤ 0 dominates, making the h/cratio higher than in a frictionless economy.
The bottom line of the Yang (2005) paper is that by adding the two modifications the
model matches the data qualitatively and quantitatively.
The Effect of House Price Changes
Li and Yao (2005) study the effect of house price changes on the macroeconomy. The
first panel of Figure 4 displays the U.S. house price index, adjusted for inflation by
deflating the nominal house price index with three different commonly used mea-
sures of inflation: namely, the consumer price index (CPI) and the deflators for both
gross domestic product (GDP) and personal consumption expenditures (PCE).
Between 1975 and 1995 real house prices more or less stagnated if deflated by the
CPI but moderately increased by about 20 percent over the twenty years if deflated
by GDP or PCE.
11 Of course, the path of house prices was not monotonic. A decline
in real house prices between 1979 and 1983 resulted from the high inflation rates in
the late 1970s and the two recessions in the early 1980s. Likewise, the 1991 recession
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8. Recall that in addition there is maintenance cost, but that enters the budget constraint separately. 
9. The shape of transaction costs is slightly different from that used in Yang’s paper, or most of
the literature for that matter. Using the convex transaction cost, however, it is easier to explain
the intuition using the Euler conditions because the necessary optimality conditions will also
be sufficient.
10. Notice that in equilibrium it is always true that γ > (r + δ
h)/(1 + r). If this were not the case, one
can show that housing investment is strictly more profitable than purchasing bonds, and nobody
would ever hold positive amounts of bonds. This outcome cannot be an equilibrium outcome
since the bond market has to clear—that is, bond savings have to equal mortgage lending.
11. This result makes perfect sense: GDP and PCE deflators tend to be slightly lower than the CPI
because the CPI computes price changes of a fixed basket while in the GDP and PCE consumers
obviously substitute into cheaper goods, thus lowering those two indexes.
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In understanding the effects that housing
and related government policies have on
households and the economy, recognizing
the economic and demographic diversity
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took a bite out of house prices, and even during the first four years of the recovery,
house prices stagnated.
After 1995, however, house prices staged an astonishing increase of almost 50 per-
cent if deflated by CPI and 60 percent if adjusted by either of the deflators. Moreover,
no decline occurred in house prices around the 2001 recession, and no stagnation
occurred after the recession. On the contrary, as the second panel of Figure 4 shows,
year-over-year growth rates in real house prices even accelerated during and after the
recession to a record pace of 8 to 10 percent in 2004.
What is the effect of these house price fluctuations, especially the large run-up
in prices since the mid 1990s? In a model without heterogeneity, a life-cycle earnings
profile, and borrowing constraints, the effect on macroeconomic variables is exactly
zero in the following sense: Imagine an economy has only one representative con-
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Consumption over the Life Cycle
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Bureau of Economic Analysissumer, earning exactly the average income and holding exactly the average house
worth 143 percent of average income. An increase in house prices would have a pos-
itive wealth effect and a negative effect because housing in the present and future
becomes more expensive. One can show, however, that the two effects precisely can-
cel each other out, so relative price changes between c and h are neutral. Utilizing
the earlier model, one can formalize this intuition. Imagine one unit of housing now
costs Ph units of the consumption good. Abstracting from transaction costs, the opti-
mality condition for housing versus consumption now becomes
(6)
This structure is familiar: The marginal rate of substitution must equal the relative
price of the two goods. Relative price is the household’s subjective cost, which in this
case is a mixture of the user cost formula 1 – (Ph′/Ph)[(1 – δ
h)/(1 + r)] and the cost of
the borrowing constraint. Notice that for
prices  Ph =  Ph′ this user cost formula
reduces to equation (4) without the terms
for the transaction cost. Notice also that
permanently changing all future real estate
prices to the same level will have no effect
on the h/cratio because house prices show
up in the optimality conditions only as ratios of two consecutive house prices. One can
then show that in the one-person economy the consumption path without the price
change is still affordable after the price change. Also, because this path satisfies the new
optimality conditions, the optimal behavior of the household is to leave the consumption
path unchanged, meaning that a permanent house price change is completely neutral.
The only way house price changes can have nontrivial effects is if households are
heterogeneous. Li and Yao (2005) use a model similar to Yang’s, though modified in
several dimensions. Most importantly, Li and Yao introduce a rental market in which
households can attain housing services via two routes: either purchasing a home,
with the purchase subject to a transaction cost, or renting it instead at a cost of αPh.
One can think of the parameter α as the rental return per unit rented. 
Li and Yao then simulate the economy after a permanent price change to housing.
Not surprisingly, renters suffer from a house price appreciation. As opposed to the
representative household mentioned above, renters have no positive wealth effect at
all because, by definition, they do not own real estate. Renters are, however, hit with
an increase in their future housing costs regardless of their future tenure decision: If
they decide to buy a house, they have to pay more, and if they continue to rent, their
cost per unit of rental goes up because the rental price is a fixed portion of the house
price P h. Li and Yao can even quantify the loss renters suffer. The loss in utility due to
an increase in P h by two standard deviations (11.5 percent) is equivalent to perma-
nently reducing all current and future consumption by about 4.5 percent.
The effect on renters is obvious and unambiguous, which is not necessarily the
case for homeowners. Li and Yao show that house price appreciation can in fact be
disadvantageous to some homeowners. The intuition for their result has to do with
the pattern of homeownership displayed in Table 2 (on page 17). The average value
of the primary residence increases for every age group until around age fifty. As
mentioned before, this increase is most likely due to the binding borrowing constraint
uc h
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Heterogeneity among households is the
crucial ingredient of any model attempt-
ing to determine the distributional effects
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that keeps young households from attaining consumption levels (both housing and
nonhousing) implied by the permanent income hypothesis. Suppose a young house-
hold owns $100,000 worth of real estate and experiences a 20 percent increase in
house prices. Instead of a $20,000 gain, the household may view this as a $20,000 loss
if it was planning to upgrade to a larger house worth $200,000, which now costs
$240,000, because the upgrade would now cost $120,000 instead of $100,000.
In conclusion, Li and Yao argue that a substantial portion of the population does
not benefit from a house price appreciation. The break-even age for homeowners is
at around age fifty, which incidentally is roughly the age at which households finish
their upgrading. Older households gain substantially from house price appreciation,
partly because many of them start moving into smaller houses or even become
renters again and are thus able to cash out some of their capital gains. Even without
downgrading, older households experience a welfare gain because the value of the
bequest they leave to their heirs increases.
Different Mortgage Contracts and the Tenure Decision of Young Households
One can interpret the paper by Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2005b) as a
follow-up to their earlier study (2005a), which uses a life-cycle model much like the
ones presented earlier to explore potential reasons for the path of the homeownership
rate over the past forty years. Homeownership stayed roughly constant at 64.5 percent
between 1965 and 1995 but then increased significantly to now almost 68 percent.
Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2005a) argue that the main reason for
this increase is the availability of mortgage contracts requiring lower down payments.
They simulate the model economy, once with a tighter and once with a looser down
payment constraint, and determine that relaxing the down payment constraint can
indeed quantitatively account for the increase in homeownership. Specifically, they
study the effect of going from a 20 percent down payment constraint to an 80-15-5
combo loan—that is, an 80 percent first mortgage, a 15 percent second mortgage,
and a 5 percent down payment.
How can the arrival of a new mortgage contract increase homeownership, espe-
cially among young agents? Recall that younger households, say, between the ages of
twenty and forty, are characterized by three features: They are far less likely to be
homeowners and have both lower income and lower net worth than the average pop-
ulation. Equation (4) reveals the main culprit for low homeownership among young
households: Because of the binding borrowing constraint, the subjective housing cost
for young agents is higher than the rental cost, discouraging young agents from buy-
ing. Reducing the tightness of the borrowing constraint (lowering parameter γ) is
then the most direct way to encourage homeownership among those agents with a
positive Lagrange multiplier µ (a binding borrowing constraint). Chambers, Garriga,
and Schlagenhauf (2005a) show that lowering γ from 20 percent in the benchmark to
5 percent under the 80-15-5 combo loan will indeed increase homeownership among
young households and can quantitatively account for the rise in homeownership.
The great innovation in the two papers by Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf
is that they model mortgages with much more care than in the rest of the literature.
The other three papers discussed here—Yang (2005), Li and Yao (2005), and Jeske
and Krueger (2005)—take one crucial shortcut when modeling mortgages:
Households roll over mortgage debt every period, that is, they choose whatever
amortization schedule suits them, constrained only by the borrowing constraint (in
Yang and Li and Yao) or the interest rate dependence on the leverage ratio (in Jeske
and Krueger). Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf, however, assume that a mort-
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mortgage. One can think of a mortgage contract then as not only an interest rate r
and a down payment ratio γ but rather a whole sequence of ratios over the lifetime
of the loan. Suppose a thirty-year mortgage with an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio
stipulates a sequence of γ starting at 20 percent and increasing very slowly over the
first couple of years (because initially most of the mortgage payment goes toward
interest rather than principal). Toward the
end of the loan more and more of the pay-
ment goes toward reducing the principal,
and eventually γ reaches 100 percent when
the loan is paid off.
Another example would be a balloon
loan, in which case γ stays at 20 percent
for the duration of the loan and after which the balloon payment comes due, which
requires the household to either pay off the loan (γ = 1) with one large payment or
refinance into another mortgage. Naturally, different loan designs imply different
payment schedules. Since the model is detailed enough to mimic a whole range of
different mortgage contracts, Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2005b) can study
how different contract types affect the tenure decision, especially of young agents.
The conclusion of their paper is that mortgage contracts that tend to have low
payments early on, such as a balloon mortgage, are most successful in relaxing the
borrowing constraint. This conclusion is intuitive: Instead of relaxing just one bor-
rowing constraint, a balloon mortgage has the same effect as relaxing the constraints
over the whole life of the mortgage relative to a fixed rate mortgage, with the excep-
tion of the last period when the entire principal is due. In general, the authors show
that mortgage contracts with an increasing payment schedule and thus lower γ over
time tend to encourage more young households to become homeowners but decrease
homeownership among older households. This finding makes perfect sense: Young
households experience an increasing earnings profile (see the first two panels of
Figure 2), which makes a mortgage with an increasing payment schedule a good
match for them. The opposite is true for middle-aged and older households whose
income, at least on average, is stagnating or even decreasing, making a mortgage with
an increasing payment schedule a mismatch to their earnings profile.
12
Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf have therefore pointed to the great impor-
tance of the borrowing constraint in determining tenure decisions over the life cycle.
Relaxing this constraint can greatly increase homeownership among younger house-
holds because it reduces the subjective user cost in equation (4) if µ > 0. This effect
occurs both for the borrowing constraint in the initial period when a household
purchases a house as well as over the duration of the mortgage.
The Effect of Subsidies
The papers discussed so far clearly specify a dual role of housing—namely, a con-
sumption role (h enters the utility function) and an investment role because housing
is also a form of saving as long as the depreciation rate is below 100 percent. One
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12. Notice that in the model the authors assume that only one single mortgage contract exists
because adding multiple contracts into the same model involves too big a computational burden.
This result should not interpreted as an argument against, say, balloon mortgages because they
reduce ownership among older households. In reality, several types of mortgages are available, so
older households can choose mortgages that suit them better than a balloon mortgage.
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ingredient missing in the literature so far has been the fact that housing investment
is risky. Jeske and Krueger (2005) set up a model in which, in addition to idiosyn-
cratic labor income risk, households face an idiosyncratic house depreciation shock.
This setup generates some realistic features: Most importantly, households may end
up with negative equity on their home if
the depreciation shock is large enough. This
feature is one way to generate mortgage
foreclosure, which has not been done before
in the general equilibrium literature. Jeske
and Krueger also assume that there is a
deadweight loss from foreclosure, taking the
following shape: If a property goes into foreclosure, the bank receives proportionally
less than the value of the property. In reality, this foreclosure loss is substantial.
Pennington-Cross (2004) estimates the deadweight loss of foreclosure to be 22 percent
of the value of the property. This loss becomes crucial in the policy experiment later
because a subsidy on mortgage rates will likely increase mortgage default as well as
the deadweight loss.
In addition, Jeske and Krueger allow households to choose any leverage ratio
they desire. This feature differs from the papers studied so far, in which households
face a sharp borrowing constraint that requires a minimum or even fixed down payment
ratio. Jeske and Krueger assume that the interest rate households pay is a function
that increases in the leverage ratio they are taking on. Specifically, a bank will price
the foreclosure risk into the mortgage, and, if a household chooses higher leverage,
a smaller depreciation shock will be required to trigger a default—that is, default is
more likely—implying a higher interest rate. Jeske and Krueger must also make some
simplifying assumptions. As opposed to the previously discussed papers, they do not
consider life-cycle effects—that is, they assume that households are infinitely lived,
and they abstract from transaction costs. Both assumptions are necessary to make
the computational burden tractable.
Suppose that a government were to provide a subsidy that lowers mortgage inter-
est. Jeske and Krueger try to study the macroeconomic effects of such a subsidy. The
subsidy the authors have in mind has a counterpart in reality—government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are in the business of
borrowing in the bond market to then purchase large portfolios of home mortgages.
The GSEs receive a benefit from the federal government in the form of an implicit
bailout guarantee.
13 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the subsidy
is worth about 42 basis points; that is, GSEs can borrow at rates 0.42 percentage
points below what other entities with a similar credit rating would have to pay in the
bond market. Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2004) estimate that only a small frac-
tion—7 basis points—actually makes it to the homeowner while the GSEs keep the
lion’s share of the subsidy to pass on to their shareholders. Blinder (2004), on the other
hand, defends the GSEs by estimating that they indeed reduce mortgage rates by
almost the entire 42 basis points.
Jeske and Krueger (2005) do not attempt to judge which of the two studies is
correct but rather do the following thought experiment: Supposing that the GSEs
indeed pass on the entire 42 basis points to homeowners as they claim, then what is
the effect on aggregate macroeconomic variables as well as the distribution of wealth
and income? 
A main finding of Jeske and Krueger is that interest subsidies, if they are indeed
passed on to households, can cause overinvestment in housing and larger mortgages.
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in housing and larger mortgages.In fact, mortgage debt increases proportionally more than the housing stock, imply-
ing more leverage on housing. This finding, of course, is less than surprising: The sub-
sidy makes housing cheaper and therefore causes more housing investment, and
lower mortgage rates encourage more leverage. Thanks to the endogenous borrowing
constraint, Jeske and Krueger are able to study one new aspect of housing policy,
namely, how mortgage subsidies affect the aggregate level of mortgage default. They
find that the subsidy increases the proportion of mortgages in default by one half,
which in turn makes the deadweight loss 50 percent larger.
The next provocative question is, What are the distributional consequences of
the subsidy? The subsidy has little effect on homeownership rates. In other words,
the assistance goes mainly to existing homeowners—those households already well
off due to high incomes and high net worth—which are able to afford even larger
houses while poor households are almost unaffected in their tenure choice.
This result is consistent with the findings of the generic housing model outlined
earlier,  especially equation (4): Lowering interest rate r and thus the user cost for
housing (r + δ
h)/(1 + r) may have only a small effect on households that are con-
strained by the down payment condition.
14 The main part of their subjective user
cost, after all, comes from the borrowing constraint (the second term on the right-hand
side of equation [4]) lowering current consumption. In the Jeske and Krueger model,
another reason why poor households will not necessarily invest in real estate and
instead keep renting is that the rental rate is determined endogenously; that is, the
rental rate is a market-clearing price ensuring that rental demand equals rental sup-
ply. With a mortgage subsidy that causes more investment in housing, the rental price
will necessarily drop, making renting more attractive relative to housing. These results
may disappoint the proponents of government assistance for mortgage financing.
Either the subsidy in the form of implicit guarantees and lower interest rates goes to
shareholders of GSEs or the interest rate reduction is passed on to homeowners but
ends up in the hands of already well-off households while doing nothing to promote
homeownership for poorer households.
The findings, by the way, are consistent with empirical work that suggests that
mortgage rate reductions have only a marginal impact on homeownership rates while
the borrowing constraint seems to play a much larger role.
15 Jeske and Krueger con-
firm these findings but are able to do so in a logical and coherent framework using
general equilibrium instead of microsimulation techniques.
Conclusion
Households in different age cohorts and different positions in the income and wealth dis-
tribution have very different homeownership ratios, real estate wealth, and mortgage
debt. Likewise, renters and homeowners look very different in their path of income and
asset holdings over the life cycle. This heterogeneity poses a challenge to researchers
trying to answer questions regarding housing policy because one cannot study the effect
of a policy merely on the average household. Studying housing in the framework of
macroeconomic models therefore requires incorporating heterogeneity of households.
Likewise, the size of the housing stock is too large to ignore general equilibrium effects.
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13. See Frame and Wall (2002) for a survey on this topic.
14. One must use caution here: The interest rate itself depends on the leverage ratio, so households
will not view it as exogenous as they did in the other three papers. The intuition, though, would
be similar in a model with an interest rate as a function of the leverage ratio.
15. See Painter and Redfearn (2002) or Feldman (2001) for a summary of a variety of empirical studies.
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Thanks to advances in computational techniques and faster computer hard-
ware, economists are now able to write down and solve models detailed enough to
accommodate housing. The conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta featured (among others) four papers, all of which are variations of the
generic housing model described here even though they touch on a large variety of
issues. Yang (2005) points out the importance of transaction costs and borrowing
constraints in life-cycle models with housing. Li and Yao (2005) study the effect of
house price changes. Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2005b) incorporate
financial innovations in the form of different mortgage contracts. And Jeske and
Krueger (2005) study the effect of a subsidy on mortgage finance. In each paper,
one can deduce the main intuition from the simple equilibrium conditions.
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